Western Narratives vs. Track Record

Western media and NGOs have persistently criticized Chinese mining investments in the DRC as “neo-colonial” or corrupt, yet seldom acknowledge the West’s own long history of exploitation in Congo. At a 2025 U.S. congressional hearing, witnesses urged Washington to counter China’s “illicit exploitation” of Congolese minerals. They blamed Chinese firms for abetting Congo’s “kleptocratic” elite, echoing a common Western narrative that paints Chinese companies as pillaging Africa’s wealth while ignoring local welfare. Western advocacy groups like The Sentry (co-founded by Western celebrities) amplify such claims, highlighting Chinese partners’ alleged abuses and calling for tougher action. Western officials also accuse China of failing to respect labor and environmental standards, citing instances where promised infrastructure or community benefits under deals like the 2008 Sino-Congolese “contract of the century” did not fully materialize.

Ironically, Western governments and corporations have perpetrated or enabled similar abuses in the DRC. From colonial plunder under King Leopold and Belgium to Cold War-era support for kleptocrat Mobutu, Western powers drained Congolese resources for over a century. Even in recent years, Western firms have engaged in corruption to secure mining deals. In 2022, Swiss-based commodity giant Glencore pleaded guilty to paying over $100 million in bribes to DRC officials to obtain preferential access to copper and cobalt mines spotlightcorruption.org. The company agreed to over $1.1 billion in fines for what U.S. prosecutors called “profit-driven bribery” across Africa and Latin America​ spotlightcorruption.org, and separately settled with the DRC government for $180 million to compensate for corruption between 2007 and 2018​ spotlightcorruption.org. Such cases reveal a blatant double standard: Western media rarely vilify these companies to the same extent they do Chinese firms. In fact, a few years ago an American corporation quietly sold one of the world’s biggest cobalt mines to a Chinese company, essentially handing Beijing a larger market share. This happened with little fanfare in Western press, underscoring how Western profit-seeking often overrides any principled stand on Congo’s behalf.Western governments also profess higher ethical standards – invoking human rights and “rigorous ESG” (Environmental, Social, Governance) criteria – yet undermine them when convenient. The European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act and “sustainable” sourcing partnerships include provisions to fast-track mining permits and override environmental concerns. Likewise, the United States lacks strong regulations to hold its mining companies accountable overseas, relying mostly on voluntary schemes that have failed in the past. In practice, Western authorities often turn a blind eye to corporate misconduct: for instance, the UK abruptly dropped a 10-year bribery investigation into Eurasian Natural Resources Corp (ENRC) – tied to suspect cobalt and copper deals in DRC – citing insufficient evidence after facing legal pressure from the company. This type of leniency, contrasted with stern rhetoric about Chinese malfeasance, signals hypocrisy in the global minerals scramble. Western leaders talk about enforcing anti-corruption and human rights in DRC, yet they have been willing to overlook wrongdoing by “their own” companies when it suits geopolitical interests.

Furthermore, Western consumers and tech giants have long benefited from Congo’s minerals, even those funneled through conflict and illicit channels. A significant share of “conflict minerals” (tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold) from eastern DRC has historically been smuggled into neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, then exported as part of global supply chains. This has directly implicated Western electronics manufacturers. In late 2024, in a historic move, the Congolese government filed criminal complaints in Europe against Apple – one of the world’s largest tech companies – accusing it of sourcing “blood” coltan and other minerals from war-torn eastern DRC reuters.com / news.mongabay.com. The lawsuit alleges that Apple was complicit in funding conflict by using minerals laundered through Rwanda. (Apple responded by instructing its suppliers to stop buying from the DRC or Rwanda, an approach critics note could hurt Congolese miners instead of Rwanda-based smugglers​ news.mongabay.com.) The fact that Kinshasa resorted to suing a U.S. corporation for war crimes – an unprecedented step – highlights the extent of Western companies’ entanglement in Congo’s resource wars. Yet Western discourse seldom frames Apple, or other firms like Tesla and Samsung, as “neo-colonial exploiters,” even though these companies knowingly profited from the very conflict minerals that NGOs have decried for years​ news.mongabay.com / news.mongabay.com. Instead, the focus remains on demonizing China’s presence. This disconnect between Western narrative and reality suggests that humanitarian concerns are often a convenient façade for what is fundamentally a fight over profit and power.

Proxy Wars and Destabilization: The Hidden Hand

Beyond narrative battles, Western powers have leveraged proxy forces and regional allies to influence the DRC’s stability – especially when Chinese interests are at stake. Nowhere is this more evident than in eastern Congo, where militias and neighboring armies have turned the region’s chaos into a profitable enterprise. A prime example is the March 23 Movement (M23) rebellion, a Tutsi-led militia that resurfaced in 2022 and has since wreaked havoc in North Kivu province. M23 is widely acknowledged as a proxy of Rwanda’s government, providing Kigali a means to project power into mineral-rich borderlands of the DRC. Rwanda, in turn, enjoys substantial military and financial support from Western nations, positioning it as a key regional ally. Western governments publicly condemn Rwanda’s backing of M23 – the UN Security Council and countries like the U.S., UK, and France have all “called out” Kigali for aiding the rebels – but this criticism stops short of action. In 2022–2023, as M23 seized swathes of territory (including the strategic city of Goma in early 2025), Western powers imposed no serious consequences on Rwanda. “Everyone has pointed the finger at Rwanda…and it has not moved the needle,” observes one Africa analyst, noting President Paul Kagame has “faced no consequences that matter to him yet.” Western reluctance to pressure Kagame reflects Rwanda’s status as a favored security partner – the same Kagame whose troops and proxies have repeatedly plundered Congolese minerals for years. This tolerance effectively enables the destabilization of eastern DRC, which conveniently undermines the central government in Kinshasa and any foreign partners (like China) helping it develop the region.

Rwanda-backed M23 rebels ride through the streets of Goma, eastern DRC (January 2025). Western powers condemn such insurgencies publicly, yet often stop short of concrete action against their allies who sponsor these conflicts.​ voanews.com

The looting of coltan and other minerals via Rwanda and Uganda is a well-documented example of proxy-enabled extraction. During the Second Congo War (1998–2003), both countries’ armies occupied parts of eastern DRC and siphoned off massive quantities of tin, tantalum (coltan), tungsten, and gold, selling them on world markets. A United Nations report noted Rwanda’s military directly facilitated the smuggling of these “3T” minerals, fueling conflict and enriching Rwandan coffers. Today, history repeats itself under M23’s shadow. In 2023, M23 fighters – with Rwandan backing – took control of the Rubaya mining area in North Kivu, one of the world’s richest coltan deposits​ reuters.com. Once in charge, the rebels established their own “mining ministry” and exclusive export routes into Rwanda reuters.com / reuters.com. Over 150 metric tons of coltan were illicitly exported to Rwanda in 2024 alone, according to U.N. experts – “the most important contamination of supply chains…on record” in the Great Lakes region​ reuters.com. By mixing smuggled Congolese ore into Rwanda’s legitimate exports, this scheme effectively launders conflict minerals and boosts Rwanda’s official production statistics. M23 and its patrons earn windfall profits (the rebels taxed traders about $800,000 per month on coltan, the UN report found​ reuters.com), while the DRC is deprived of both revenue and sovereignty over its resources.

Crucially, Western countries indirectly benefit from this plunder. Much of the coltan (used to make tantalum capacitors) ends up in the global electronics supply chain, feeding manufacturers in Europe, the U.S., and Asia​ news.mongabay.com / news.mongabay.com. Western companies get access to Congolese minerals at world market prices, without having to acknowledge the dirty origins. The Rwanda conduit provides deniability – firms can claim their tantalum comes from “conflict-free” Rwanda, even though investigators have shown that 90% of Rwanda’s 3T mineral exports are actually smuggled from the DRC. The Congolese government has repeatedly warned Western buyers not to purchase these “looted minerals” from Rwanda. In 2022, Kinshasa even sued tech companies as mentioned, directly accusing them of sourcing via Rwanda’s illicit trade. Yet, Western governments have not sanctioned Rwanda for these actions; instead, the European Union signed a “strategic partnership” on critical minerals with Rwanda in 2023 – all while Rwandan troops were (according to the UN) actively invading eastern DRC and supporting M23. The EU talks of mineral “traceability” in such partnerships, but critics note the absurdity: “Western countries propose traceability schemes with Rwanda even as Rwandan-backed rebels smuggle Congolese minerals,” essentially rewarding the smuggler. This cynical realpolitik suggests that Western powers quietly accept or even leverage Rwanda’s illicit role as it aligns with their interests: keeping Congolese mineral flows accessible but outside China’s full control.

Western involvement in Congo’s insecurity isn’t limited to Rwanda. Uganda, another U.S.-allied country, also intervened militarily in the DRC and benefited from illicit gold and timber trades. Multinational mining companies have at times funded armed groups for access – for example, in the 2000s, a Western gold company was found to have paid a militia for “security” at a mine in Ituri. While the specifics vary, the pattern of proxy destabilization serves Western hegemony by weakening any central authority in the DRC that might favor Chinese or independent deals. A destabilized eastern DRC also provides a pretext for Western military presence or UN peacekeeping, which, while ostensibly neutral, further embeds international influence in Congo’s affairs. Notably, Western military aid continues flowing to Rwanda and Uganda despite their Congo incursions. Human Rights Watch has urged the U.S., EU, and UK to suspend military support to Rwanda over M23, but meaningful cuts have yet to happen. Meanwhile, “global distractions” – such as crises in the Middle East and internal Western politics – mean even less attention and pressure on African conflicts. Kagame has adroitly cultivated an image of Rwanda as a “stable partner” to the West, hosting international conferences and even negotiating controversial migrant resettlement deals with the UK. These relationships act as a shield, ensuring that Western geopolitical priorities (like containing Islamist militancy in Africa or handling Europe’s migrant flows) take precedence over resolving Rwanda’s depredations in the DRC. The end result is that Congolese lives and stability are sacrificed on the altar of great-power competition: proxy wars simmer, benefiting those who traffic in conflict minerals, while Western powers selectively intervene or abstain, depending on what best undermines their economic rivals (chiefly China) and secures their own strategic interests.

Legal Warfare and Sanctions: Undermining China Through Policy

While proxy militias sow chaos on the ground, Western governments deploy legal and economic pressure tactics to reshape Congo’s mining sector in their favor. One such mechanism is sanctions and lawfare, ostensibly used to fight corruption but often aligning neatly with Western commercial ambitions. A striking case is that of Dan Gertler, an Israeli businessman who for years was a middleman for Western firms (like Glencore) seeking mining deals with former president Joseph Kabila. In 2017, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Gertler for “opaque and corrupt” deals that allegedly cheated the DRC out of $1.36 billion. This move under the Global Magnitsky Act was hailed as a stand against corruption. However, by 2021–2023, as Felix Tshisekedi’s government tilted West and the U.S. grew concerned about China’s dominance, Washington began reconsidering Gertler’s status. Reports emerged that the Biden administration was prepared to lift sanctions on Gertler if he divested his mining assets, thereby allowing those rich cobalt and copper projects to be snapped up by Western companies. Indeed, the U.S. explicitly hoped this deal would “incentivize Western-leaning companies” to access the DRC’s minerals. In other words, sanctions became a bargaining chip: by first blacklisting Gertler (which also incidentally squeezed some Chinese-linked ventures he was involved in), and then dangling relief, the U.S. pressured him to sell on terms favorable to the West. Gertler stands to pocket an estimated $300 million from these “ill-gotten” assets upon sale, a pointed irony given the purported anti-corruption rationale. This episode lays bare how sanctions policy can be weaponized to clear the field for Western companies under the guise of reform. As one analysis noted, it allowed Washington to “get its way” in Congo, showing that sanctions – far from purely principled – are a strategic tool in great-power competition.

Western powers also engage in judicial and arbitration battles to contest Chinese advances. A notable example is the fight over the Manono lithium project in southern DRC – one of the world’s largest untapped lithium deposits. Australian miner AVZ Minerals held the rights until 2023, when DRC authorities unexpectedly stripped AVZ of its license, alleging the project was not being developed fast enough. That license was then reassigned to a new joint venture involving China’s Zijin Mining, a move that AVZ and its Western backers viewed as highly suspect. In response, AVZ launched legal arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) – a forum where Western investors often seek recourse – and won emergency orders to block the transfer. When Congo’s state mining firm Cominière ignored those orders, the ICC tribunal imposed a €39.1 million penalty on Cominière for non-compliance. By March 2025, AVZ announced a legal victory: the ICC affirmed its rights and penalized the DRC and Zijin’s venture. Simultaneously, AVZ entered talks with U.S. entities to raise financing for Manono, effectively inviting Western capital to replace the ousted Chinese partner. This sequence suggests that Western governments quietly backed AVZ’s fight – indeed, reports indicate the U.S. government was keenly interested. In early 2025, a senior White House advisor for Africa visited Kinshasa to discuss a possible “security-for-minerals” deal, signaling U.S. support for projects like Manono in exchange for closer ties. According to media leaks, the Trump administration (which returned to power in 2025) even considered insisting that Manono be “handed back” to the Australian company as part of advancing U.S. critical mineral interests. This high-level political engagement, unprecedented for a mining dispute, shows the lengths Western powers will go to thwart Chinese acquisitions. The DRC’s pivot to a Chinese miner was reframed as a breach of contract and governance – quickly met with Western legal firepower and diplomatic pressure until it was reversed.

Another strategy is the use of targeted trade measures and new laws to squeeze Chinese mining companies. U.S. policymakers have floated legislation to restrict China’s grip on Africa’s critical minerals. A proposed bill in the U.S. Congress aims to “curb China’s dominance” in Africa’s mineral supply chains, noting that Beijing controls an estimated 70-80% of DRC mining operations. Similarly, the U.S. has introduced tariffs and trade incentives to tilt the playing field. Under updated trade policies, Congolese exports of battery minerals enjoy low tariffs into the U.S. (only 11%) and certain exemptions – making it attractive for Kinshasa to engage U.S. companies instead of Chinese ones. This is part of a broader Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) spearheaded by the U.S. and allies, which offers financing and trade perks to countries that cooperate in diversifying away from China. For instance, the U.S. Development Finance Corporation extended a $150 million loan for a graphite project in Mozambique in late 2023, explicitly to secure an alternative source for EV battery material. In effect, Western governments are subsidizing “risky” mining investments that private firms might avoid, all to catch up with China’s head start. American officials openly admit this. In May 2024, a White House energy adviser stated that “the government has a real role here of incentivizing private capital by taking more risk”. This marks a significant shift – after years of preaching free-market and anti-corruption norms, Western states are now injecting state support and turning a blind eye to local political risks if it helps dislodge Chinese influence.

Legal and diplomatic maneuvering also shows up in host-country decisions encouraged by Western partners. The Congolese government itself, under President Tshisekedi, has taken steps aligned with Western interests, often at China’s expense. In 2021, Tshisekedi launched a review of mining contracts signed with Chinese companies under his predecessor Kabila, seeking to “rebalance” terms. One outcome was a renegotiation of the big 2008 Sino-Congolese minerals-for-infrastructure deal; however, local observers said it did little, and Western NGOs lambasted China for failing to deliver on infrastructure and for poor labor practices​ allafrica.com. Encouraged by this Western narrative, Tshisekedi went further: by 2023–2024 his government started outright voiding or disputing Chinese-linked licenses. Besides the Manono case, Kinshasa moved to halt the sale of a major copper-cobalt mine by Trafigura’s partner Chemaf to China’s Norinco in 2024. The mines minister claimed the Chinese purchase violated a lease with state company Gécamines and got the cabinet to block the deal. This was a bold interference in a private transaction, and it notably favored the status quo (Trafigura, a Western trader, retained its influence through Chemaf) over a new Chinese entrant. Such actions send a clear message: Chinese companies cannot assume their deals are safe in DRC if Western rivals have an interest. The playing field is increasingly being reset via legal edicts, often applauded by Western diplomats under the banner of “cleaning up” the mining sector. However, many Congolese see a geopolitical undercurrent. Tshisekedi himself “offered the U.S. and Europe a stake in [DRC’s] vast mineral wealth” in early 2025, explicitly to gain Western security support against Rwanda’s aggression. This quid pro quo suggests DRC’s leadership is leveraging great-power competition to its advantage – but it also indicates that Western security assistance is now being conditioned on access to minerals. In private, Congolese officials dub this emerging arrangement “security for minerals”, a 21st-century update of colonial-era practices. Ultimately, Western powers are positioning themselves as the “protectors” of DRC (against rebels and neighbors) in exchange for preferential treatment in mining deals. It’s a form of neocolonial bargaining, clothed in the language of strategic partnerships and rule of law.

The Manono Lithium Flashpoint: Competing for the Future

No case better illustrates the West vs. China contest in Congo than the struggle over the Manono lithium project. Lithium, vital for electric vehicle batteries, has gained strategic importance as the world shifts to clean energy. The Manono deposit in Tanganyika province – with an estimated 400 million tonnes of high-grade lithium ore – is a glittering prize. Originally, Australia’s AVZ Minerals partnered with DRC’s state company Cominière to develop Manono, bringing hope of jobs and infrastructure to the long-neglected region. But as lithium demand soared, global interest in Manono intensified. In 2021, a Chinese mining giant, Zijin Mining, began maneuvering to acquire a stake. Controversy erupted when Cominière secretly sold 15% of the Manono joint venture (known as Dathcom) to Zijin at a knock-down price. A DRC government watchdog later slammed this sale as a “cut-price sell-off” causing the state a $120 million loss. The stage was set for a showdown: AVZ (backed by Western and Australian investors) versus Zijin (backed by Chinese capital), each vying for control of what could be Africa’s Saudi Arabia of Lithium.

The DRC government’s actions swung in China’s favor – then back again under Western pressure. In early 2023, the Ministry of Mines abruptly revoked AVZ’s mining permit, citing its alleged failure to develop the site quickly. Shortly thereafter, a new permit for Manono was issued to a Chinese-controlled entity (jointly owned by Zijin and Cominière). AVZ was effectively elbowed out, its share price collapsing (it was even delisted from the Australian exchange amid the uncertainty)​ reuters.com. Chinese media celebrated a win, but AVZ cried foul, accusing Congolese officials of corruption and breach of contract – allegations that resonated given the opaque share sale. The company pursued international arbitration, and behind the scenes, Western diplomats raised concerns about the DRC’s business climate. By late 2024, as the arbitration leaned in AVZ’s favor, Kinshasa began hedging. President Tshisekedi, eyeing relations with Washington, signaled willingness to reconsider Chinese stakes. Indeed, by April 2025 we see parallel court and boardroom moves: AVZ’s legal victory at the ICC in March 2025, followed by the DRC courting new Western developers for Manono. An American firm, KoBold Metals – backed by billionaire investors Bill Gates and Jeff Bezos – openly expressed interest in taking over the project. KoBold even proposed an ambitious plan to develop Manono as a large-scale, long-term mine, and its cause was boosted by a high-profile visit of a U.S. presidential envoy to Kinshasa. This envoy discussed a framework to support U.S. companies like KoBold, hinting at an American security umbrella to protect the investment. In essence, the U.S. was prepared to backstop the project politically and financially, outmatching the support Zijin could muster from Beijing.

By mid-2025, Western firms were lining up for a piece of Manono. Besides KoBold, Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto signaled interest in partnering if AVZ regained the license. This rush underscores the financial motives driving Western engagement: lithium is a strategic commodity, and whoever controls Manono could influence the EV battery supply for decades. The DRC, for its part, is playing both sides to maximize benefits. President Tshisekedi offered the U.S. and Europe a direct stake as a “snub to China”, hoping to also leverage Western pressure on Rwanda in the M23 conflict​ allafrica.com. However, even Congolese experts caution that relying on an American solution may be a “mirage”. Most existing concessions are already locked up (often by Chinese-led consortia), and the U.S. has no major mining operators left in DRC since Freeport-McMoRan’s exit in 2016. That exit itself was telling: Freeport sold its Tenke Fungurume cobalt mine to China Molybdenum, reportedly without consulting Kinshasa, which angered many in the DRC. The Western narrative now emphasizes “fair deals” and transparency, yet the profit calculus is clear – companies like Rio Tinto or KoBold see a fortune in lithium, and Western governments see a way to cut China out of a critical supply chain. The Manono saga is thus a microcosm of the new scramble: legal battles, media campaigns about corruption, and great-power diplomacy all converging on a single mine.

Notably, Western media and NGOs have given Manono outsized attention – often casting the Chinese involvement in a sinister light. Global Witness, a U.K.-based advocacy NGO, published a report raising alarms about corruption in African lithium projects, singling out Manono as at risk. They warned that African countries could “lose their influence” over strategic minerals if shady deals proceed. This implicitly pointed to the Chinese share deal. Meanwhile, the voice of the Congolese people has been less heard in Western coverage. In Manono town, locals simply want the mine to start so jobs and development will follow; many are frustrated that legal wrangling has delayed progress. Western outlets frequently frame it as China vs. the rule of law, but on the ground it can feel like West vs. China at the expense of Congolese hopes. The government’s flip-flopping – welcoming Zijin one year, then courting Americans the next – also exposes Kinshasa to charges of opportunism. Still, for Western powers, the principle at stake (however dressed up) is geostrategic control. A successful Chinese-run lithium mine in Congo would strengthen China’s dominance in battery materials, whereas a Western-run project (with Congolese partnership) could supply Tesla, GM, or European firms on more “friendly” terms. Thus, Western intervention in Manono is not about protecting Congo’s sovereignty – it is about aligning Congo’s output with Western supply chains and away from China’s. The outcome of this contest will set a precedent for other projects (cobalt, copper, etc.), showing whether Western influence can reverse China’s lead in Africa’s resources through coordinated pressure.

Corporate Players and Anti-China Narratives

Underpinning these maneuverings is a chorus of Western companies, consultancies, and think tanks that shape the anti-China narrative while positioning themselves for business. Firms like Glencore and Trafigura, though rarely mentioned in the same breath as “corruption” in mainstream media, have immense stakes in Congolese minerals and benefit from Western sway. Glencore, the largest cobalt producer after acquiring huge mines during the Kabila era (often via Gertler’s help), has a vested interest in curbing Chinese competition. The company’s own misdeeds in DRC – multi-million-dollar bribes and opaque deals – were acknowledged in court but received relatively muted press compared to, say, coverage of Chinese labor rights issues. Trafigura, a Swiss-based commodity trader, similarly maintains a significant presence: it financed Chemaf’s copper-cobalt operations and struck a deal in 2020 with the state cobalt buyer (EGC) to purchase up to 50% of DRC’s artisanal cobalt for five years. This effectively gives Trafigura a semi-monopoly over hand-dug cobalt supply. Western media often cast such moves as “formalizing” the informal sector or helping improve standards, even as Trafigura secures lucrative offtake rights. In contrast, when Chinese firms buy artisanal cobalt through informal channels, it’s labeled as exploitative. The narrative framing is starkly selective. Trafigura’s arrangement was even touted by some NGOs as a step toward responsible sourcing, despite the obvious profit motive. The company has past scandals (from toxic waste dumping in Côte d’Ivoire to alleged sanctions-busting), yet it enjoys respectability as a “Western” firm at the table in Congo.

Western think tanks and lobby groups also play a role in demonizing Chinese actors while promoting Western ones. The Atlantic Council, an influential U.S. think tank, published commentary praising the potential lifting of Gertler’s sanctions as a “win-win” that could let U.S. companies invest in DRC mining projects (once Gertler is out) and advance U.S. geopolitical goals. In the same breath, it frames this as helping DRC combat corruption – a claim viewed skeptically by Congolese civil society. Other policy voices in Washington openly argue for restrictions on Chinese minerals. For example, an AEI (American Enterprise Institute) paper in 2024 bluntly recommended the U.S. “limit China’s access” to DRC cobalt and lithium as a national security priority (essentially advocating resource hoarding). On Capitol Hill, a bill was introduced – the “Stop China’s Exploitation of Africa” act – echoing language that paints China as the singular predator in African mining. Such discourse feeds into media soundbites and is reinforced by think tank experts who frequently comment in Western media, seldom recalling that Western companies still control significant shares of DRC’s minerals or that Western tech and EV firms directly create demand for those very resources.

Western media outlets themselves often cite reports by NGOs like Global Witness, The Sentry, or Human Rights Watch to underscore wrongdoing in DRC’s mining sector – and these reports, more often than not, highlight Chinese companies or Congolese government corruption. For instance, in the lithium sector, Global Witness raised alarms about murky sales involving Chinese buyers. The Sentry has focused on how Chinese-linked kleptocracy harms Congo, with recommendations that dovetail with U.S. policy interests (e.g. sanctioning Chinese entities or encouraging DRC to partner with the U.S.). To be sure, these groups also criticize Western companies at times – The Sentry’s co-founder George Clooney has spoken about conflict minerals ending up in our gadgets, implicating Western corporates. But the policy prescriptions often call for Western intervention as the solution, implicitly casting Western actors as more accountable. Human Rights Watch, for example, demanded that Western governments cut aid to Rwanda to force a change in its behavior with M23. While a principled stance, no such strong measures have been taken; Rwanda continues to receive substantial aid and even hosts the British-funded migrant centers. This disconnect between recommendations and action hints that Western governments use these critical reports instrumentally. They can point to them to justify diplomatic pressure on Congo or China (“we must act because of human rights”), but when those same standards would require punishing an ally or a Western corporation, the zeal fades.

In shaping the narrative, Western media often emphasize China’s dominance numerically – repeating statistics that China controls 70-80% of DRC’s cobalt and copper production. While roughly accurate in terms of ownership stakes and offtake agreements, this framing can be misleading. Much of the output owned by Chinese firms (like China Molybdenum’s Tenke Fungurume mine or Zijin’s Kamoa-Kakula copper joint venture) still feeds Western and global markets. Moreover, those mines were frequently acquired in open bids or sales from Western companies. Yet, headlines speak of “China’s monopoly” and imply that Congolese resources are locked away from the West. This narrative provides a convenient rallying cry for Western politicians who want to galvanize support for new Cold War-like initiatives in Africa. It glosses over the fact that Western companies willingly sold many of these assets to China (e.g., Freeport’s sale of Tenke Fungurume in 2016, or various juniors selling projects to raise capital) and that Western demand continues to drive extraction. For example, cobalt ends up in batteries for Tesla or Volkswagen regardless of whether a Chinese or Swiss company mined it. However, by constructing the issue as “Chinese control = bad for the world,” Western leaders justify interventions like the ones detailed above.

Even Western development NGOs and aid agencies sometimes feed into the geopolitical agenda. They argue for “good governance” in DRC’s mining – which in practice means urging Kinshasa to renegotiate contracts (usually Chinese ones) and adopt Western “best practices” in tendering new licenses. France, the former colonial power in neighboring Congo-Brazzaville and an influential player in Francophone Africa, has limited direct mining stakes in the DRC today but uses its diplomatic clout via the EU and UN to shape outcomes. French officials have publicly supported Tshisekedi’s moves to review mining deals and have been outspoken on Rwanda’s meddling (partly to restore France’s tarnished image after the Rwanda genocide). The UK, for its part, launched a Critical Minerals Strategy and has funded transparency initiatives in DRC – all with an eye towards ensuring British and Western firms are not shut out of the future “green minerals” boom. Think tanks like Chatham House in London or IFRI in Paris publish reports highlighting China’s rise in African mining and recommending ways Europe can respond, invariably emphasizing partnership with African governments (contrasted with China’s purported exploitation). The subtext is clear: Western powers seek to re-legitimize themselves as Africa’s partners of choice in the mineral sector, despite their own dubious legacy.

Routes of Influence and Control Mechanisms

Bringing these threads together, we can identify the specific routes and mechanisms through which Western hegemony operates in the DRC’s cobalt-coltan-lithium supply chain:

• Propaganda and Narrative Control: Western-funded NGOs and media outlets spotlight Chinese misdeeds (corruption, labor abuses, lack of transparency) in DRC, while downplaying Western misbehavior. This shapes public opinion and policy discourse to view Western involvement as a corrective or positive influence. Example: Reports of “Chinese companies exploiting child labor” make global headlines, whereas the fact that Western tech giants knowingly benefitted from those same mines leads to far less outrage. By controlling the narrative, Western actors build moral justification for intervention (sanctions, aid conditionality, etc.) in African resource sectors.
  
  

• Diplomatic Leverage and Co-optation: Western governments use diplomatic channels to co-opt Congolese leadership. The contested 2018 election that brought Tshisekedi to power had strong U.S. support despite irregularities​ allafrica.com; since then, Tshisekedi has leaned West. He receives backing in international forums (e.g., UN, World Bank) and security aid in exchange for aligning with Western interests – such as offering stakes to Western firms and pushing back on China’s dominance​ allafrica.com. Western embassies in Kinshasa are highly involved in mining sector “reforms,” often advising on contract renegotiations and legal disputes, essentially lobbying within the DRC government on behalf of Western companies.
  
  

• Economic Pressure and Incentives: Tools like sanctions (freezing out undesirable players), debt relief, and aid packages are used to reward or penalize behavior in the minerals sector. The U.S. treasury’s sanctions on Dan Gertler (and their conditional lifting) sent a message to Congolese power-brokers: collaborate with sanctioned individuals (who often partnered with Chinese firms) and face isolation, or distance yourselves and enjoy renewed access to Western capital. Meanwhile, Western aid and development finance is increasingly tied to projects that exclude China, like the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation funding non-Chinese mining projects or the EU’s Global Gateway offering infrastructure tied to European companies. These create financial carrots and sticks linked to who controls Congo’s minerals.
  
  

• International Legal Forums: Western entities make deft use of international courts and arbitration, where Western influence and legal norms dominate. When deals involving Chinese companies are contested (as with AVZ vs. Zijin, or various ICSID cases), Western firms have confidence in impartial hearing – and Western governments often quietly support those legal battles with amicus briefs or diplomatic pressure. The threat of costly arbitration or asset seizures abroad can deter DRC from simply nationalizing and handing projects to China without due process. At the same time, Western nations are adept at using their own courts to target foreign competitors – for instance, U.S. courts can prosecute bribery under the FCPA, and European courts can entertain human-rights lawsuits, creating legal hazards for Chinese companies that Western firms know how to navigate or settle.
  
  

• Proxy Warfare and Security Intervention: As discussed, Western-aligned regional forces (Rwanda/Uganda) and local militias (like M23) serve to destabilize regions and complicate Chinese operations. If Chinese companies cannot operate safely due to conflict, they lose their edge. Simultaneously, Western private military contractors or special forces training can be offered to Kinshasa under “stability” programs, giving Western powers on-the-ground influence. For example, the U.S. has provided military training to Congolese units (ostensibly to fight ISIS-affiliated rebels in east DRC), but those relationships could just as easily be leveraged to protect mining sites of interest. Militarization of resource-rich areas – whether by rebels or foreign “advisers” – ensures that control over minerals is never too far from the barrel of a gun, something Western powers have long experience in managing.
  
  

• Corporate Alliances and Offtake Agreements: Western commodity traders and mining multinationals form alliances to carve up supply routes. For instance, Glencore’s long-term offtake contracts supply cobalt to Western automakers, giving Glencore leverage to lobby Western governments about securing Congolese production. The creation of cartels or monopolies over certain supply streams (like Trafigura’s tie-up with EGC for artisanal cobalt) is another mechanism of control – it keeps a significant portion of resources in Western-led channels, reducing what Chinese competitors can buy on the open market. These companies also invest in branding their operations as ethical – citing compliance with OECD due diligence or funding local community projects – to differentiate from the stereotype of the “irresponsible Chinese miner.” This PR makes it politically easier for Western governments to back them.

All these mechanisms feed into a broader strategy: reasserting Western hegemony over Africa’s strategic materials in the 21st century, much as was done in past centuries under colonialism and the Cold War, but with updated tactics. The competition with China is the driving force – Western actions consistently aim to limit China’s access, influence, or public image in relation to Congo’s minerals, even if the methods sometimes harm Congo’s own immediate interests.